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C E N T R A L     I N T E L L I G E N C E     A G E N C Y

16 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
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Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)

SUBJECT : NIE 11-55: Probable Soviet Response to the  
Ratification of the Paris Agree-  
ments

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on Wednesday, 15 December.
2. This estimate is scheduled to reach the IAC on Tuesday, 1 February, and it is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Friday, 14 January. Insofar as possible, agencies will submit contributions in advance of the final due date.

*Paul A. Borel*

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Distribution "B"

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## THE PROBLEM

### ASSUMPTION

Note: Since full implementation of the Paris Agreements will require several years after ratification, the Soviet response may be keyed less to ratification itself than to implementation of the Agreements, and Soviet courses of action may develop in accordance with the degree to which implementation is progressively achieved. Consequently, contributions should include, where possible and appropriate, not only short-term estimates related to the ratification of the Agreements, but also longer-term estimates which take account of the time required for their full implementation.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RATIFICATION

- A. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the military implications of West German rearmament? (Contributions should include the Soviet estimate of the consequences, with respect to Soviet defensive and offensive requirements, of the increment to Western strength resulting from West German rearmament. They should include also the Soviet estimate of any long-term threat which West German rearmament may carry for the security of the Bloc.)
  
- B. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the political implications of West German rearmament and of the increased prestige and influence West Germany will obtain in Europe? Contributions should include estimates of the consequences of West German rearmament for:

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- a. the political security of Communist power in East Germany and the Satellites;
  - b. the cohesiveness and determination of the NATO states;
  - c. the policies of states which are not members of NATO or the Soviet Bloc -- especially Yugoslavia, Finland, and Sweden; and
  - d. future negotiations on Germany unity.
- C. In general, in the Soviet view, how will the ratification of the Paris Agreements change the political and strategic relationships of the Soviet Bloc and the West in Germany and in Europe? How will the USSR estimate that ratification will affect the achievement of Soviet objectives in these areas?
- D. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the time that will be required before full implementation of the Paris Agreements is achieved? What is the probable Soviet estimate of the opportunities that will remain

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in Germany, France, and elsewhere, for preventing, delaying, or offsetting the implementation of the Paris Agreements after their ratification?

II. POSSIBLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

A. What courses of action could the USSR pursue in attempting to prevent, delay, or offset the implementation of the Paris Agreements? (Contributions should discuss possible Soviet local reactions, particularly in Berlin and East Germany, and such other possible courses of action as the organization of an Eastern collective defense system to parallel NATO, the building up of the military strength of the GDR and the Bloc, or, alternatively, offers to withdraw from East Germany and to effect German reunification on terms closer to those previously required by the Western Powers.)

B. What, over a longer period, might be the courses of action which the USSR and the Bloc might undertake to

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counterbalance the increase of Western power resulting from full implementation of the program for rearmament of West Germany? For example: will the USSR be willing over the long run to tolerate the Western enclave of Berlin if East Germany is incorporated completely in a tighter Bloc defense system? Will the USSR plan to increase the scale of its own and the Satellites' military effort? Will the USSR eventually seek direct negotiations with West Germany?

- C. Are these limitations upon possible Soviet courses of action imposed by domestic economic and political objectives and commitments, by general foreign policy goals, and by security requirements in Eastern Germany and the European Satellites? Are there other impediments to Soviet freedom of action in countering West German rearmament, and, if so, what are they?

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D. In view of the above, what are the relative advantages and disadvantages to the Soviet Bloc of the various alternative courses of action discussed?

III. PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

On balance, what are the probable Soviet courses of action?

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